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. RECENT CASE NOTES

Nov. 3-Making the Police Force an Efficient Fighting Unit. 0. W.
Wilson, Chief of Police of Wichita, Kansas; interviewed by Will Shafroth,
Assistant to the President of the American Bar Association.
Nov. 10-Scientific Research in the Field of Criminal Justice. William
Draper Lewis, Director of the American Law Institute.
Nov. 17-The Preservation of Constitutional Liberty Under the New,
Deal. Donald R. Richberg, General Counsel of the National Recovery Administration.
Nov. 24-Administrative Tribunals v. Courts Under the New Deal.
Thomas D. Thacher, President of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York.
Dec. 1-Shall We Abandon Ship? A Discussion Concerning the Coffstitution and Present Governmental Trends. James M. Beck, Former Solicitor
General of the United States.
Dec. 8-Selecting Our Judges. Paul V. McNutt, Governor of Indiana.
Dec. 15-Needed Reforms in Criminal Procedure. Roscoe Pound, Dean
of Harvard Law School.
Dec. 22-Fundamental Aspects of the New Deal from a Lawyer's Point
of View. John W. Davis, Former Solicitor General of the United States.
Station List-Central Standard Time 6:45 to 7:00 P. M. Cincinnati,
Ohio, WKRC; Indianapolis, Ind., WFBM.

RECENT CASE NOTES*
Constitutional Law--General and Special Laws-Appellant brought an
action seeking a judgment declaring Chapter 31, p. 153 of the Acts of 1933
unconstitutional. The statute provides that in all second and fourth class
cities (Hammond, Gary, Whiting and East Chicago) located in a county
having a population of not less than 250,000 nor more than 400,000 (Lake),
the office of city treasurer is abolished, and all of the rights, powers, and
duties of such city treasurer are conferred upon and shall be performed by,
the county treasurer: that the county treasurer shall appoint a deputy to
collect and disburse the taxes and assessments in each such city. Appellant
contended the law was -local and special and therefore offended section 23 of
Article 4 of the Constitution of Indiana. Section 23 provides that "In all
cases enumerated in the preceding, and in all other cases where a general law
can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform application:
throughout the state." Held, the statute is a local and special law and unconstitutional because in conflict with section 23 of article 4 of the Constitution
of Indiana.'
A law which applies generally to a particular class of cases is not a local
or special law.2 The question which then arises is "What is a proper. classifification?" The Indiana law on this point is well summarized in the cases
cited in the principal case :3
* This department is devoted to the publication of critical comments and annotations
of Indiana cases from both the Supreme and Appellate courts, decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and cases in the Federal District and-Circuit Court of Appeals
arising in Indiana. The work done in preparing this material is performed by the stu-:
dents and faculty of the Indiana UniverSity Law- School.
.
1 Heckler v. Conter (1933), 187 N. E. 878 (Ind.).
.2 131 Ind. 446.,

3Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465; School City of Rush

ville v. Hayes, 162 Ind. 193, 70 N. E. 198; Bullok v. Robison, 176 jnd.. 198, 93 N. E. 998.
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"The characteristics which can serve as a basis of a valid classification
must be such as to show an inherent difference in situation and subject-matter of the subjects placed in different classes which peculiarly requires
and
'4
necessitates different or exclusive legislation with respect to them."
"Classification must embrace a class of subjects or places, and not omit
any. one naturally belonging to the class. It must be based on some reasonable ground, which bears a just and proper relation to it, and not be a mere
arbitrary selection. .

.

. The characteristics serving as a basis must be of

such substantial nature as to mark the objects so designated as particularly
requiring exclusive legislation. There must be a substantial distinction having reference to the subject-matter of the proposed legislation, between the
objects or places embraced in it and the objects or place§ excluded. Whether
a law is general or special depends on its subject-matter, not its form." 5
The requirements for a valid classification seem to be (1) a reasonable
basis for the classification, and (2) the law must operate upon all within
the class. 6
The following classifications have been sustained as reasonable: an act
applying to privately owned public utilities and not to those owned or operated by municipalities ;7 an act applying to cities having a population of not
less than 50,000 nor more than 100,000.8 But where an act applied to cities
of more than 85,000 and less than 86,000 inhabitants, the act was held local
and special, and unconstitutional. 9 The court took judicial notice that the
statute applied only to Evansville. 9
A special law is one made for individual cases, or for less than a class
requiring laws appropriate to its particular condition and circumstances, or
one relating to particular persons or things of a class. 10
Acts providing that when a certain number of freeholders of a township
or townships petition for highways or highway improvements, the proper
board of commissioners shall proceed with such case are held to be general
laws.'
Under a constitution providing that where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted, laws of a general nature do not necessarily have to operate upon every locality in the state, but such laws must
apply equally to all classes similarly situated and to like conditions and subjects. 12
It must be noticed that under section 23 of article 4, a general law is not
necessary except in cases where a general law can be made applicable. 13 Who
is to decide in a given case whether or not a general law can be made applicable? In the principal case, it was contended by appellees that this was a
question for the legislature, and that the legislative determination of that
question was not subject to judicial review. In support of their position,
4 Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465.

5 Bullock v. Robison, 176 Ind. 198, 93 N. E. 998.
6Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen (1911), 177 Ind. 1; Railroad Commission v. Grand
Trunk (1912), 179 Ind. 255; Sarils v. State (1928), 201 Ind. 88.
7 Springfield Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Springfield (1920), 292 Ill.
236, 126
N. E. 739.
8 Bumb v. City of Evansville (1906), 168 Ind. 272.
9 Rosencranz v. City of Evansville (1923), 194 Ind. 499, 143 N. E. 593.
10 State v. Foster, 28 N. M. 273, 212 P. 454; 7 Words and Phrases (3rd series),
p. 76.
11Gilson v. Board of Commissioners (1890), 128 Ind. 65; Strange v. Board of
Commissioners (1909), 173 Ind. 640.
12 Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 225 Pac. 640; See also Cooley: Constitutional
Limitations, p. 259.
13 Constitution of Indiana, Article 4, Section 23.
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appellees cited the case of Gentile v. State.1 4 In that case it was held that
since all members of the legislature were required to take oath to support
the constitution of the state, it could not be presumed that the members would
disregard their obligations in this respect in deciding whether or not the
constitutional restriction on special laws was or was not applicable. The
court in the principal case properly repudiated the doctrine of Gentile v.
State, pointing out that the same reasoning would apply to all provisions of
the constitution limiting the power of the legislature, and that whenever the
legislature over-stepped one of these bounds, the fact that the members had
been bound by oath would not prevent such legislation being held unconstiS.S.
tutional.
Contracts-Arbitration-Sherman Act-Plaintiff Distributing Corporation sued the Defendant Theater Company for damages for breach of
contract in which contract the defendant agreed to pay a fixed sum for the
privilege of exhibiting certain pictures in defendant theater. The alleged
breach of contract consisted of defendant's refusal to accept, play, or pay
for the motion picture productions for which it had contracted. Defendant
contended that the clause of the contract which required that the plaintiff
should have pursued a course of arbitration before resorting to court action
had not been complied with and also that the contract sued on was in restraint
of trade and a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Plaintiff obtained
judgment in the trial court. Held: on appeal, affirmed, the court declaring
that the clause requiring arbitration was void as in violation of the Sherman
Act. but that the contract was divisible and thus the remainder could be sued
upon.'
The first attack on the validity of the Standard Exhibition Contract in
the motion picture industry was made by the federal government in 1929.
As a result of such attack, the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation v. United States 2 found that the
activities of the defendant producers and distributors, including the agreement to adopt and to use the Standard Form Contract, with its compulsory
arbitration clause, constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade and thus in
violation of the Sherman Act. 3 As a result of this decree, the question arose
as to what effect the decision must have on the thousands of contracts made
in the standard form by distributors and exhibitors throughout the country.
Before proceeding with the discussion, let it be said that the court's finding that the arbitration clause is invalid, yet the contract is divisible and the4
remaining portions are enforceable is not without respectable authority.
But there is, also, equally as strong authority to the contrary.5
(1868) 29 Ind. 409.
1 Walker Theater Co. v. R. K. 0. Distributing Corporation (Ind. 1934), 189
14

N. E. 162.
2 (1930), 282 U. S. 30, 51 S. Ct. 45.
3 26 Stat. 209 (1891) ; 15 U. S. C. Nos. 1-7, 15 (1927).
4 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corporation v. Cocke (Texas 1933), 56 S. W.
(2d) 489; Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation v. National Theater Corporation
(C. C. A. 1931), 49 Fed. (2d) 64; Fox Film Corporation v. Buchanan (1931), 17 La.
App. 285, 136 So. 197; Fox Film Corporation v. Bailly (S. Dak. 1932), 246 N. W. 111;
Fox Film Corporation v. Ogden Theater Company (Utah 1932), 17 Pac. (2d) 294;
Columbia Pictures Corporation v. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. (1930), 42 Fed. (2d) 873.
5 United Artist Corporation v. Odeon Bldg. (Wis. 1933), 248 N. W. 784; Fox Film
Corporation v. C. & M. Amusement Co. (1932), 58 Fed. (2d) 337; United Artists
Corporation v. Piller (N. Dak. 1932), 244 N. W. 20; Universal Film Exchanges v.
West (Miss. 1932), 141 So. 293; Fox Film Corporation v. Tri-State Theaters (Idaho
1931), 6 Pac. (2d) 135; Vitagraph Inc. v. Theatre Realty Co. (1931), 50 Fed. (2d)
907; see Majestic Theater Co. v. United Artist Corporation (1930), 43 Fed. (2d) 991.

